In this short note we study a class of multi-player, turn-based games with deterministic state transitions and reachability / safety objectives (this class contains as special cases "classic" two-player reachability and safety games as well as multi-player and ""stay-in-a-set" and "reach-a-set" games). Quantitative and qualitative versions of the objectives are presented and for both cases we prove the existence of a deterministic and memoryless Nash equilibrium; the proof is short and simple, using only Fink's classic result about the existence of Nash equilibria for multi-player discounted stochastic games.
Introduction
The simplest ω-regular games are, arguably, two-player turn-based safety and reachability games [7] . Multiplayer variants of these are the "Stay-in-a-set " (SIAS) games [6, 8] and "Reach-a-set " (RAS) games [1, 2] . The existence of Nash equilibria (NE) has been proved: for SIAS games in [8] and for RAS games in [1, 2] ; in particular in the special case of turn-based games with deterministic state transitions and Borel objectives (these include SIAS and RAS objectives) the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium (NE) is proved in [2, Corollary 1] . In both cases the state space is assumed finite and the NE are not, in general, memoryless.
1 A stronger result is proved in [9] , namely: every turn-based multi-player game with deterministic state transitions and Borel objectives possesses a pure sub-game perfect (and hence memoryless) equilibrium. These results are quite general but their proofs are rather involved.
In the current note our main goal is to provide a short and simple proof of a special case: every turn-based SIAS and RAS game with deterministic state transitions possesses a deterministic and memoryless NE. This is proved using only Fink's classic result on the existence of NE for multi-player discounted stochastic games [5] .
Our result is actually a little more general, in that it applies to the class of multi-player, turn-based games with deterministic state transitions, reachability objectives for some players and safety objectives for others. For brevity, we will henceforth refer to these as multi-player reachability / safety games (MPRS games); they contain as special cases classic reachability and safety games as well as SIAS and RAS games.
Informally, the MPRS game can best be visualized as a graphical game, in which N players move a token along the arcs of a digraph G = (V, E). The vertices of G are partitioned into N sets: V = V 1 ∪ V 2 ∪ ... ∪ V N ; if at the t-th turn the token is located on a vertex v t ∈ V n , then it is moved by the n-th player (henceforth denoted by P n ) into some vertex v t+1 such that (v t , v t+1 ) is an arc of G. In general we have two type of players: reachers and avoiders. To each P n is associated a nonempty set R n ⊆ V , related to his objective. If P n is a reacher, he wins iff the token enters some vertex v ∈ R n ; if he is an avoider, he wins iff the token never enters a vertex v ∈ R n .
In Section 2 we define the quantitative MPRS game and prove that every such game has a NE in deterministic memoryless strategies. In Section 3 we do the same things for the qualitative MPRS game.
The Quantitative MPRS Game
We now formulate MPRS as a discounted stochastic game.
2 In what follows the quantities N , V , E, V 1 , ..., V N , R 1 , ..., R N are the ones presented in the previous section.
1. The player set is {P 1 , P 2 , ..., P N } or, for simplicity, {1, 2, ..., N }.
2. The state set is S := V ∪ {s}, where V is the vertex set of the previously mentioned G = (V, E) and s is the terminal state.
3. We define {S 1 , ..., S N }, a partition of S, as follows:
4. For n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N }, P n 's target set is R n ; the total target set is R := ∪ N m=1 R m . 5. A n (s) denotes P n 's action set when the game is at state s and is defined by (λ is the "trivial" move):
6. The law of motion is deterministic and has the following form when s ∈ S n \R and a = (λ, ..., a n , ..., λ) :
when s ∈ R ∪ {s} and a = (λ, ..., λ, ..., λ) :
All admissible state/action combinations are covered by (2.1)-(2.2), from which we see the following.
(a) If the current state s "belongs" to P n (i.e., s ∈ S n ) and is not a target state, then he is the only player who can perform a non-trivial action a n ∈ V ; the next state is, with certainty, a n .
(b) If the current state s is either target or terminal, then the only admissible action vector is a = (λ, ..., λ, ..., λ); the next and all subsequent states are the terminal s.
It is convenient to describe the deterministic state transitions in terms of a state transition function T : S × A → S, defined by T (s, a n ) := a n when s ∈ S n \R and a n ∈ A n (s) \λ, s when s ∈ R ∪ {s} and a n = λ.
All admissible state/action combinations are covered by (2.3).
7. P n 's turn payoff function depends only on the current game state s (but not on the current action vector) and can be either of the following: q n (s) := 1 when s ∈ R n 0 when s / ∈ R n (P n is a reacher); q n (s) := −1 when s ∈ R n 0 when s / ∈ R n (P n is an avoider).
P n 's total payoff function is (with the discount factor γ ∈ (0, 1)):
The game starts at an initial state s 0 = s ∈ S\s and, at the t-th turn (t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}) all players perform "trivial" moves, except for the player who "owns" s t . Two possibilities exist.
If a target state is entered at some time
R m ) the next and all subsequent states are the terminal (∀t > t ′ : s t = s). 3 For each n ∈ {1, ..., N }, P n receives total payoff: 2. If a target state is never entered (∀t : s t / ∈ R), the game continues ad infinitum and all players receive zero payoff.
A reacher (resp. avoider) P n wants the game to enter R n in the shortest (resp. longest) possible time. Hence the above defined discounted stochastic game will be called "quantitative MPRS game".
A finite-length history is a finite sequence of states (we omit player actions, since they will not be needed in our proof 4 ):
the set of all finite-length histories is denoted by H * . A deterministic strategy for the n-th player is a function σ n which assigns an action to each finite-length history: σ n : H * → A n . A strategy σ n is called memoryless if it only depends on the current state, in which case we write (with a slight notation abuse)
A strategy profile is a tuple σ = σ 1 , σ 2 , ..., σ N which specifies one strategy for each player. As usual,
, so we can write σ = (σ n , σ −n ). Since an initial state s 0 and a deterministic strategy profile σ determine fully the history s 0 s 1 s 2 ..., the payoff function Q n (s 0 , s 1 , ...) will also be written as
Theorem 2.1 Every quantitative MPRS game has a deterministic memoryless NE. In other words, there exists a profile of deterministic memoryless strategies σ = σ 1 , σ 2 , ..., σ N such that ∀n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N } , ∀s 0 ∈ S, ∀σ n :
For every s and n, let u n (s) := Q n (s, σ). Then the following equations are satisfied ∀n, ∀s ∈ S n : σ n (s) = arg max
Proof. Fink has proved in [5] that every N -player discounted stochastic game has a memoryless NE in probabilistic strategies; this result holds for the general game (i.e., with concurrent moves and probabilistic strategies and state transitions). According to [5] , at equilibrium the following equations must be satisfied for all m and s:
...
where we have modified Fink's original notation to fit our own; in particular: Now choose any n and any s ∈ S n . For all m = n, the m-th player has a single move: A m (s) = {λ}, and so p m (a m |s) = 1. Also, since transitions are deterministic,
Hence, for m = n, (2.7) becomes
Furthermore let us define σ n (s) (for the specific s and n) by
If (2.8) is satisfied by more than one a n , we set σ n (s) to one of these arbitrarily. Then, to maximize the sum in (2.8) the n-th player must set p n ( σ n (s) |s) = 1 and p n (a n |s) = 0 for all a n = σ n (s). Since this is true for all states and all players (i.e., every player can, without loss, use deterministic strategies) we also have u n (s) = u n (s). Hence (2.8) becomes u n (s) = max a n ∈A n (s)
[q n (s) + γu n (T (s, a n ))] = q n (s) + γu n (T (s, σ n (s))) . The most general MPRS game involves N 1 reachers and N 2 avoiders; we can have more than one winners (e.g., if P m and P n are reachers, both win if the token enters some v ∈ R m ∩ R n = ∅) and the same is true for losers. It is easily checked that every σ = σ 1 , ..., σ N which is a NE of the Q n 's is also a NE of the Q n 's. Hence, by Theorem 2.1, we have the following. Corollary 3.1 Every qualitative MPRS game has a deterministic memoryless NE.
